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The United Nations at Fifty: 
A Reform Agenda
Janice Gross Stein
[L]et us be frank with each other, and with the peoples of the 
United Nations. We have not yet achieved the sweeping and 
fundamental reform that I and many others believe is required. 
Sharp differences, some of them substantive and legitimate, have 
played their part in preventing that.1
Secretary-General Kofi Annan
I. Introduction
The United Nations has just gone through a very unhappy birth-
day year. Its sixtieth birthday was supposed to be a year of reform, 
renewal, and regeneration. Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched the 
reform process, fully aware that the credibility of the U.N. was at stake. 
Two years before its birthday, in 2003, the Security Council was mar-
ginalized when the United States and its allies went around the dead-
locked Council to go to war against Iraq. A serious and damaging story 
of U.N. mismanagement of the important Oil-for-Food program in Iraq 
came to light in 2004, and the Volcker Commission that investigated it 
reached into the Secretary-General’s office when it assigned responsi-
bility. The run-up year to the birthday party can best be described—in 
the words of the Secretary-General—as an annus horribilis. The legiti-
macy of the United Nations, its capacity, and its relevance, were all at 
issue.
Partly in response to these very difficult years, but also in recogni-
tion of deep structural changes in the post-Cold War global order, 
the Secretary-General commissioned a series of high-level panels and 
reports to advise him on a process of reform that would better equip 
the United Nations to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. 
The world in which the United Nations was created in 1945—one 
of all-encompassing war among states and formal empires—was no 
more. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
the long frozen stalemate through the heart of Europe and proxy wars 
3
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worldwide, ended forty years later. The post-Cold War euphoria and 
the hope that a newly invigorated U.N. would finally be free to fulfill 
its founders’ hopes dissipated in the killing fields of Rwanda and the 
Balkans. The early years of the twenty-first century, especially after 
September 11th in New York, were like a splash of cold water, inviting 
a sober reappraisal of security and sovereignty.
The first high-level panel, appointed to examine the growing impor-
tance of civil society and non-governmental organizations to the work 
of the U.N., released its report in 2004. The second high-level panel 
was asked to examine the challenges to collective security, the core of 
the United Nations’ mandate. In its report, released in the autumn of 
2004, it looked first at the prevention of threats to collective security, 
then at the conditions that shape the use of force, and, finally, at the 
institutional reforms necessary to equip the U.N. to deal with the new 
challenges. A third appointed panel published its commissioned report 
in January 2005 on the responsibilities of the United Nations in meet-
ing the challenges of development.2
The three reports provided a rich source of analysis and com-
mentary that informed the thinking of the Secretary-General as he 
prepared for the special summit of world leaders on the sixtieth anni-
versary of the United Nations. In his response, the Secretary-General 
knit together the fundamental values and commitments that would 
inform a reinvigorated United Nations. He defined the interconnected 
challenges as development, security, and human rights—freedom from 
want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live in dignity.3 Annan issued 
a series of challenges, requiring specific decisions, to the 154 heads of 
state and government that came to New York for the World Summit, 
held September 14–16, 2005.
The year of reform has now passed. How well did members of the 
United Nations do in meeting the challenges outlined by the Secre-
tary-General? The short answer is that the glass is half full. We can 
argue about whether the glass is half empty or at least half full, as 
the Secretary-General concluded after the summit.4 To explain why I 
reached the judgment that the glass is at best half full, I begin by look-
ing at the conceptual innovation the three reports provide to frame 
contemporary challenges in security, development, and human rights. 
What kind of world order, if any, do we have? Is the U.N. protecting a 
global order that is structured and legitimate, or is it an important part 
of restructuring a global system that is fragmented and contested? The 
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answer to this question matters in creating reasonable expectations of 
what the U.N. can and cannot do.
As I consider the three broad normative categories of freedom from 
want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live in dignity, I look at par-
ticular clusters of challenges that speak to each of these normative con-
cerns and constitute the core of the reform agenda. I stay away from 
the thorny issue of Security Council reform, a perennial issue, which 
has resisted solution for decades and, for that reason, seems an unfair 
test of the adaptability of the United Nations.
•  In considering the freedom from want, I assess how well the U.N. 
has done in putting in place a global partnership for development, 
in moving toward goals of debt reduction, in setting standards for 
development assistance, and in putting in place the coalitions and 
machinery that will enable progress toward the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals.
•  In considering the freedom from fear, I look at changes in the con-
ception of sovereignty and their consequences for peace and secu-
rity. Has the U.N. been able to develop the capacity to respond to 
threats to human security that challenge deeply embedded concepts 
of state sovereignty? Has the U.N. moved forward on the basket 
of issues that we call peace building and post-conflict reconstruc-
tion? Is the U.N. better equipped to address the security challenges 
that are likely to emerge when states are only one of many players, 
military technologies are being miniaturized, and militias are armed 
with technologies that cross borders?
•  In considering the freedom to live in dignity, I look at how far the 
U.N. has moved on making human rights a meaningful and impor-
tant component of its institutional machinery. Has it been able to 
build in an element of accountability, so that states that routinely 
and massively violate human rights are no longer represented in 
key institutions?
•  Finally, I look at the important, if unglamorous, issue of manage-
ment reform. Without improvement to its capacity to manage, the 
U.N. will be unable to deliver better performance. In this birthday 
year, have some of the glaring deficiencies in management pro-
cesses that hobble the United Nations been corrected?
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This kind of assessment should permit a balanced scorecard, an 
evaluation of how far the U.N. has come in the last year, and how well 
equipped it is to face the big challenges of the decade ahead. Is the 
U.N. likely to be one of the core institutional building blocks of global 
security, or is it likely to fade into voluble obscurity, a place to stop and 
talk, but not much more?
One caveat: It is paradoxical that defenders of the U.N. routinely 
attack the convenient fiction that there is a United Nations. There is no 
United Nations, they insist, but rather a collection of governments that 
come together in the General Assembly, in the Security Council, in the 
Human Rights Council. The U.N. is “us,” the member states. When the 
U.N. fails to act, to manage, to reform, it is not the U.N. that is failing, 
its proponents claim, but its members. It is “we” who are failing. It is, 
by extension, unfair to hold this abstraction we call the United Nations 
accountable for our failings.
This argument strikes me as disingenuous. If the argument is that 
intergovernmental bodies with broad mandates are crippled ab initio, 
that they are by nature suboptimal performers, then we need to take 
the argument seriously indeed and look creatively to other kinds of 
institutions to meet the challenges of global security. This is an argu-
ment that many admirers of the U.N. resist, and resist strongly.
Alternatively, one can argue there are many bodies that are inter-
governmental and there are many institutions that have both very dif-
ficult stakeholder communities and principal-agent relationships. The 
U.N. is unique in the extraordinarily broad scope of its membership 
and its mandate, but not in its intergovernmental composition or its 
stakeholders. Its challenges differ in degree but not in kind.
A more fruitful way of conceiving the United Nations is not as a sin-
gle institution but as at least three: an intergovernmental organization 
of states that constitute its core membership; the secretariat that staffs, 
manages, and leads the work of the intergovernmental organization; 
and the communities of experts and non-governmental organizations 
that work closely with the first two.5 It is up to the leadership of all 
three United Nations to navigate the shoals of governments as mem-
bers and to manage through to better outcomes. Although the respon-
sibilities and the performance of all three are closely intertwined, it is 
possible to develop reasonable expectations of each in their respective 
areas of responsibility. The mandate of the U.N. makes it too important 
to have no expectations whatsoever because it is an intergovernmental 
institution.
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II. The Freedom from Want
Perhaps the best place to dissect the emergent architecture in which 
the United Nations lives is the report the Secretary-General prepared 
to inform the debate of the special session of the General Assembly 
in 2005. Much of what Kofi Annan tells us about development would 
be familiar to students of global politics reading a similar document 
twenty or thirty years ago, but some would not. What is also new is the 
dense interconnections that he draws across his reform agenda.
The Secretary-General begins with the most basic: freedom from 
want, the fundamental right of people to live free from hunger and 
with drinkable water, decent shelter, and freedom from preventable 
disease. These basic economic and social rights have been recognized 
for decades as fundamental, but the report treats them as bedrock, 
as foundational. The report moves beyond these foundational rights, 
however, to connect them to a bigger basket of rights. “In larger free-
dom,” the Secretary-General writes, “encapsulates the idea that devel-
opment, security, and human rights go hand in hand… . Not only 
are development, security, and human rights all imperative; they also 
reinforce each other.”6 This phrase merits attention. It captures frag-
ments of the new paradigm that the Secretary-General uses to frame 
the global environment of the United Nations.
First, development is justified not only for its own sake, but also as 
the critical underpinning of global security. Poverty (which kills 20,000 
people every day), disease, inequality, displaced people that number 
approximately 25 million (nearly one-third of whom cannot be reached 
by the U.N.), and permanent communities of refugees all degrade the 
human and social condition. They simultaneously create the precon-
ditions for the militarization of states and for the “militiazation” of 
politics by aggrieved young people who see no hope and no future. 
Threats to world peace and security, at the core of the mandate of the 
United Nations, are no longer restricted to territorial disputes among 
sovereign states. They take many forms but they all grow and thrive in 
an ecology of scarcity.
The focus of the United Nations is on the achievement of the Mil-
lennium Development Goals, agreed to in 2000, elaborated in Monter-
rey in 2002, and targeted by 2015.7 Jeffrey Sachs, in his commissioned 
report, urged the U.N. to promote a number of “quick wins” to create 
momentum and also to dispel widespread donor fatigue and cynicism 
that development assistance can be effectively used and actually con-
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tribute to development. In his response, the Secretary-General urged 
developing states to recommit themselves to increasing development 
assistance to 0.7% of their budgets—a longstanding target—in order to 
better help countries with honest, committed governments to escape 
“poverty traps.” In language that would not have been familiar twenty 
years ago, however, he also urged developing countries to take “pri-
mary responsibility” for their own development by “strengthening 
governance, combating corruption, and putting in place the policies 
and instruments to drive private-sector-led growth and maximize 
domestic resources to fund national development strategies.”8
The Secretary-General’s report reflects the new forces that are shap-
ing the environment of the U.N. and redefining the challenges. A sec-
ond core element of the new paradigm of development is that states 
and international institutions are no longer the only or, at times, the 
primary actors in development. Although part of the new paradigm is 
certainly an emphasis on the responsibilities of the developed world, 
there is also an emphasis on the responsibilities of developing coun-
tries, on their nationally developed and “owned” strategies to reduce 
poverty. Less expected is the attention given to strengthening the role 
of the private sector, and to the role of civil society.9 The leadership 
of the U.N. no longer sees development exclusively as a state-based 
responsibility, but as a partnership among international institutions, 
the private sector, global and local civil society, and the developed and 
the developing world. In this complex and closely connected environ-
ment, the U.N. emerges as one among several nodes with a special 
responsibility to enable and facilitate development.
A. Progress on Development
How much progress has been made on development? Over half the 
final outcome document of the World Summit deals with develop-
ment, an indication of its central importance to the vast majority of 
members of the General Assembly. But how much new ground was 
broken? Very little. The United States, unenthusiastic originally about 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), did agree to accept them 
as the frame of reference for ongoing work in development. Yet it is 
already transparently clear that most of the Millennium goals will not 
be met, and that, in some cases, the gap is widening. To be fair, expec-
tations were set very high and the United Nations has played a key 
role in setting the norms that shaped these expectations.10
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More to the point, the World Summit affirmed work that had 
already been done, without pushing the agenda much further. Under 
the leadership of the Secretary-General, leaders knit together the new 
players in international development in a much more comprehensive 
way. Nevertheless, progress on the core building blocks has been very 
limited, even in the months following the special session of the General 
Assembly. The World Summit did push forward some very general 
proposals for financing development, even though no new major com-
mitments were made.
The Secretary-General, as we have seen, asked member states to 
recognize the global partnership for development, with an interlocking 
set of roles and responsibilities. This the World Summit did, paying 
special attention to the responsibility of states receiving development 
assistance to enact good governance and mobilize domestic resources. 
In return, the final document speaks of a graduated increase in devel-
opment assistance, with specific deadlines. However, these deadlines 
had been largely agreed to by the European Union before the Summit. 
The final document also speaks of innovative financing instruments: an 
International Finance Facility and a levy on airline travel, an idea pro-
posed over a decade ago. No binding commitments were made at the 
Summit. Progress on both these issues took place among a “coalition of 
the willing” around the edges. The Summit did not put global capital 
markets and the international financial institutions on its agenda. At 
most, we can argue that the World Summit was a spur to activity by 
other institutions outside the U.N. family.
Members were also asked to accomplish a focused set of objectives.11 
The rate of progress tells us something important about the complexity 
of the development environment, and about the challenging role of the 
U.N. as enabler.
•  There has been some limited progress on debt reduction, largely 
as a result of civil society working through the Group of Eight. The 
G-8 proposed in 2005 to cancel 100 percent of the outstanding debt 
that the eighteen most heavily indebted poor countries owed to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Development 
Association (IDA), and the African Development Bank (ADB)—a 
nominal value of $40 billion over 40 years, or a savings of $1 billion 
annually for all the 18 countries. They will still have to pay their 
debt to other multilateral creditors. Moreover, the IDA and the ADB 
will be reducing gross aid payments to each of these countries by 
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the amount of debt cancelled, and redistribute the funding among 
all IDA and ADB lenders within the category. This means that these 
eighteen most heavily indebted countries will benefit much less 
from the reduction of their debt. The G-8 also agreed to provide 
additional resources to the three lenders so that their financing 
capacity is not reduced by the cancellation of the debt payment.
Much of this work took place outside formal U.N. machinery. The 
World Summit meeting did recommend cancellation of 100 percent 
of the official multilateral and bilateral debt of twenty other heav-
ily indebted poor countries.12 Beyond the most heavily indebted, the 
Summit spoke only in the vaguest of generalities: relief would be on a 
case-by-case basis, based largely on the sustainability of the individual 
debt. There was no progress on the long-demanded redefinition of 
what constitutes a sustainable debt. This kind of commitment does not 
provide much of a road map forward on responsible debt forgiveness.
•  The Doha Round of multilateral negotiations, managed within the 
World Trade Organization, remains deadlocked over the conten-
tious issue of agricultural subsidies in developed countries, which 
effectively block agricultural exports from developing countries.
•  Some of the “quick win” initiatives suggested have been led by 
private foundations, notably the Gates Foundation, and by non-
governmental organizations. Progress has been greatest in public 
health, but it has been made largely outside the World Health Orga-
nization and UNAIDS. This kind of pattern is likely to grow in 
importance over time.
On the fringe of the Summit, the “Lula Group” (Brazil, France, Chile, 
Spain, Germany, and Algeria) proposed the introduction of a solidar-
ity contribution on airline tickets.13 The proceeds would go in part to 
refinance the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm), 
which was created just before the World Summit by Britain, Spain, 
Italy, Sweden, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. They expect 
the IFFIm to help raise $4 billion in international capital markets over 
the next decade to support the work of the Global Alliance for Vac-
cines and Immunization (GAVI). The British hope to demonstrate the 
possibility of raising development assistance through capital markets. 
Although the concept of development aid on credit garnered little 
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support in the final document of the World Summit, the first proceeds 
from the tax on air travel have begun to flow to IFFIm.14
•  On increasing development assistance, the World Summit codified 
what individual and groups of countries had already agreed to do. 
In June 2005, for example, the EU agreed to increase ODA to an EU 
average of 0.56% of GDP by 2010 and to 0.7% by 2015.
How do we assess the role of the United Nations on a set of issues 
that the Secretary-General has identified as critically connected to the 
foundational mandate of the organization? The Secretary-General 
played an important role in setting norms, defining expectations, and 
drawing out key decisions and markers that should be met. His was 
the “bully pulpit,” a not inconsiderable role and responsibility. That 
bully pulpit was effective in stimulating governments and non-gov-
ernmental organizations to make new commitments and launch new 
initiatives in preparation for the World Summit. Even though deci-
sion making was situated in multiple sites—a few within the United 
Nations but many outside of its formal structure, even its extended 
structure—the Secretary-General set the table, focused attention on 
development, and prodded others to action. The U.N. is today only 
one node, an important node but still only one, in a complex network 
of institutions, states, civil society organizations, and private sector 
firms that shape development. Nevertheless, it has special responsibili-
ties in enabling and pushing the development agenda forward. Even 
though the U.N. is unlikely to be the driver of the development agenda 
in the next decade, it can and should be its enabler.
III. The Freedom from Fear
Perhaps the most sweeping changes to the traditional framing of the 
mandate of the United Nations have taken place on the issues of peace 
and security. It is these issues which are at the core of the Charter and 
constitute the principal preoccupation of the United Nations. These 
issues engage the most central institutions of the United Nations, the 
Security Council and the General Assembly. And yet, as the Secretary-
General noted, “While, in the development sphere, we suffer from 
weak implementation, on the security side, despite a heightened sense 
of threat among many we lack even a basic consensus and imple-
mentation, where it occurs, is all too often contested.”15 The diagnosis 
is apt. The report goes further: “These are not theoretical issues but 
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issues of deadly urgency,” the Secretary-General writes. “If we do not 
reach a consensus on them this year and start to act on it, we may not 
have another chance.”16 It is this urgent warning that inspired the title 
of my original paper: “The United Nations is late, very late, for a very 
important date.”
This sense of urgency underlies three significant changes to the 
traditional concept of threats to peace and security that is embedded 
in the U.N. Charter and has informed the work of the U.N., particu-
larly the Security Council. These three seminal changes are the explicit 
recognition of the shortness of time, the interconnectedness among 
threats, and the radical revision of the concept of sovereignty. All three 
have profound consequences for what the United Nations takes on and 
for the way the Security Council does its work.
A. The Shortness of Time
The global security environment, like other global environments, has 
changed significantly in the last several decades. The time to make 
decisions is much shorter than it used to be, making the world far 
more dangerous and accident-prone than before. Technology and poli-
tics together have created a set of threats that allows very little time 
for deliberation before a response. The shortness of time first became a 
recognized security issue when nuclear weapons entered the arsenals 
of the major powers. Yet their conceptual and practical consequences 
were limited, perhaps unfairly, because it was the large established 
states with strong established machineries of command and control 
that had a monopoly on nuclear weapons. As miniaturization devel-
oped and unit costs went down, increasingly destructive technologies 
with the capacity to reach farther and farther across borders prolifer-
ated. Response times shortened. Add to the brevity of time the priva-
tization of the arms trade, including nuclear arms, and the dual use of 
civilian technologies, and the time for Security Council deliberation on 
an urgent threat shrinks.
It is within this shrinking window for Security Council action that 
the Secretary-General asked U.N. members to consider when and how 
it was appropriate to consider “the early authorization of coercive 
measures.”17 The high-level panel responded that the Security Council, 
but only the Security Council, may authorize preventive war against 
an attack that was apparently or immediately imminent. However, 
individual states may not invoke a right to prevention under the clause 
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of the Charter, Article 51, which authorizes the use of force in self-
defense. The panel ruled out unilateral prevention as legitimate under 
the Charter, even as it moved to fundamentally change the concept of 
state sovereignty that was the foundation of the United Nations.
The Secretary-General also invoked the shortness of time for deci-
sions, the corresponding sense of urgency to identify the intercon-
nectedness of threats, and a changing concept of sovereignty as major 
challenges to global security.
B. The Interconnectedness of Threats
The deepening of complex linkages around the world in the last thirty 
years, which we summarize conveniently with the term “globaliza-
tion,” has also connected the consequences of breaches of security 
much more tightly. The consequences of a nuclear attack in the Middle 
East, for example, would spread worldwide. Indeed, the costs and con-
sequences of the attacks on New York and Washington on September 
11, 2001, attacks carried out with commercial airplanes, have cost in 
the billions of dollars and have rippled around the globe. The Secre-
tary-General identified not only international war and conflict, but 
civil violence, organized crime, terrorism, weapons of mass destruc-
tion, poverty, deadly infectious disease, and environmental degrada-
tion as interconnected in the basket of threats to peace and security. 
The occurrence of one exacerbates many of the others and heightens 
global security challenges.
IV. Sovereignty as Responsibility
The Secretary-General also drew on the bitter failure of the United 
Nations in Rwanda to engage directly with the meaning of sovereignty, 
when security no longer means only state security but human security. 
In his analysis of the growing crises of the internally displaced, Francis 
Deng pioneered a concept of sovereignty not only as a right but also as 
a responsibility.18 The International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS), an independent panel created by Canada 
which worked closely with the Secretary-General, extended the con-
cept of sovereignty as responsibility in its 2001 report, The Responsi-
bility to Protect.19 The Commission noted the gap in the mandate of 
international institutions to deal with governments that turned against 
their own citizens, engaged in widespread and systematic abuse, and 
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created massive human suffering. International institutions, the com-
missioners observed, have no mandate to intervene to stop this kind 
of suffering. The responsibility to protect, the report argued, is an 
emerging principle of customary international law supported both by 
a range of legal sources and by state practice.20
The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change under-
lined and extended the principle of the responsibility to protect in its 
report. It insisted that all signatories to the U.N. Charter accept not 
only their obligations to their fellow members, as the conventional 
understanding of collective security suggests, but also a responsibil-
ity to protect their own citizens.21 Sovereignty is contingent, then, as 
much on internal as on external behavior. This concept of sovereignty 
changes the foundation of the post-Westphalian order, which had gov-
erned states for the last three-and-a-half centuries. Sovereignty is no 
longer defined exclusively as autonomy and can no longer be invoked 
to shield a government’s failure to protect its own citizens from the 
interference of others. On the contrary, states are obligated to come 
to the assistance of citizens who are being systematically harmed or 
abused by their own governments.
The panel was careful to specify the kinds of actions that obligate 
member states to exercise their responsibility to protect the citizens 
of other states. These include genocide and other large-scale killing, 
ethnic cleansing, and other serious violations of international humani-
tarian law, actions that are at the highest end of the conflict spectrum 
and the most severe abuses of human rights. Here the panel joins 
human rights with global security, and extends the meaning of security 
beyond states to individuals, to groups, and to citizens. The Secretary-
General affirmed all of these conceptual changes and more. He asked 
explicitly that heads of government make the decision at the special 
60th-anniversary session of the General Assembly to affirm “the right 
of the Security Council to use military force, including preventively, to 
preserve international peace and security, including in cases of geno-
cide, ethnic cleansing, and other such crimes against humanity.”
A. Progress on Sovereignty as Responsibility
On the issue of sovereignty as responsibility, the Secretary-General 
achieved an extraordinary success. The change to the meaning of sover-
eignty was highly controversial. For many within the developing world 
contending with colonial histories and memories, this language was a 
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thinly veiled disguise of a new imperialism, an imperialism which 
wrapped itself in international law to justify the forcible intervention 
by the North against the South. Only hard and persistent work by the 
Secretary-General and like-minded states allayed some of these fears. 
Pushed forward by Canada, 162 world leaders unanimously accepted 
the principle of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), a responsibility 
which is engaged when populations are at risk of genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In April 2006, the 
Security Council reaffirmed the principle in Resolution 1674. The pas-
sage of these resolutions constitutes the most sweeping changes to legal 
concepts of sovereignty in modern times, and extends the protection of 
international humanitarian law inside states. From the introduction of 
the concept by ICISS to its codification by the General Assembly and 
the Security Council, it was only a matter of some five years.
The practice, not surprisingly, has fallen short of the normative 
standard. The Security Council was famously and shamefully inac-
tive during the genocide in Rwanda. It was deadlocked during the 
ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. It was these failures to act that led to 
the creation of the ICISS and to the revision of customary international 
law. Yet when large-scale massacres of civilians and the displacement 
of millions of people occurred in Darfur, it took the Security Council 
almost eighteen months to pass a resolution condemning the killings. 
At no point has the Security Council threatened to use military force, 
after the fact, to enforce the responsibility to protect. So, although law 
and norms may have changed, the Security Council through acts of 
omission stands in violation of the changes to law and norms that it 
has promulgated.
V. Progress on Arms Control and Disarmament
What about the other decisions the Secretary-General asked leaders to 
make at the World Summit? Here the record is far less encouraging. 
Most obvious was the failure to make even rhetorical progress on the 
control of weapons of mass destruction. The World Summit took place 
only a few months after the disappointing failure of the review confer-
ence on the Non-Proliferation Treaty to come to agreement. The Sec-
retary-General had asked world leaders to come into compliance with 
existing treaties on non-proliferation, biological weapons, and chemi-
cal weapons conventions. Particularly pressing—and long outstand-
ing—was the need for progress on a fissile material cut-off treaty and a 
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moratorium on nuclear test explosions, which has lapsed. The ongoing 
crises with North Korea and Iran, the leading threshold nuclear states, 
made progress on nuclear arms control by the nuclear powers impera-
tive, if states are to be dissuaded from breaking out of existing treaties 
that restrain the development of nuclear weapons.
There was no substantive forward movement during or after the 
World Summit. The lack of progress is not surprising, given the 
longstanding refusal of some of the major nuclear powers to accept 
additional restraints. It is nevertheless deeply discouraging that an 
assembly of world leaders, celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the 
United Nations, was unable even to agree on appropriate language 
on nuclear arms control and disarmament to insert into the outcome 
document of the summit. Clearly disappointed, Kofi Annan called the 
failure to include a section on reducing the threat from weapons of 
mass destruction a “disgrace.” This comes at a time when the existing 
fabric of non-proliferation appears to be shredding. It is clear that the 
General Assembly of the United Nations is no longer able even to give 
voice to its formal responsibilities on arms control and disarmament.
VI. Progress on Terrorism
A second issue to which the Secretary-General gave great weight was 
an unequivocal condemnation of terrorism. The High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges, and Change had broken new ground in its recom-
mendations on terrorism. The panel dismissed the conventional bro-
mide that one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter. It 
rejected outright any targeting of civilians, intentional or unintentional, 
for any political purpose, and it proposed a clear, if controversial, defi-
nition of terrorism. It defined terrorism as “any action…intended to 
cause death or serious bodily harm to non-combatants, when the pur-
pose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a popula-
tion, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do 
or to abstain from doing any act.”22
The language of the Secretary-General’s charge to the World Sum-
mit was even stronger than that of the high-level panel. The moral 
authority of the United Nations, he insisted, had been compromised 
by the inability of members to agree on a definition of terrorism. He 
urged the assembled leaders to:
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…affirm that no cause or grievance, no matter how legitimate, justifies 
the targeting and deliberate killing of civilians and non-combatants; and 
declare that any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily 
harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, 
by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a Gov-
ernment or an international organization to do or abstain from doing 
any act, constitutes an act of terrorism.23
He asked as well that world leaders agree to implement a comprehen-
sive U.N. counter-terrorism strategy to dissuade people from resorting 
to terrorism or supporting it, to deny terrorists access to funds and 
materials, to deter states from supporting terrorism, and to develop 
state capacity to defeat terrorism and defend human rights. The Sec-
retary-General asked specifically that leaders conclude a convention 
on nuclear terrorism “as a matter of urgency” and a comprehensive 
convention on terrorism before the end of the sixtieth session of the 
General Assembly.24
The urgent tone of the Secretary-General’s language is not surpris-
ing. Agreement on a definition and action on terrorism was important 
conceptually and practically to the reform of the United Nations. The 
new emphasis on human security, he insisted, dictates that, “the dig-
nity, justice, worth, and safety” of every citizen be at the heart of a 
twenty-first century system of collective security.25 The conceptual shift 
to human security as the foundation of collective security is inconsis-
tent with the targeting of civilians, no matter what the reason. It is also, 
as the Secretary-General made clear, part of the seamless integration of 
human rights with security and development; and terrorism is a fun-
damental violation of human rights. Finally, in the wake of September 
11th, global attention to terrorism has increased. Measures to constrain 
terrorism, along with an unequivocal rejection of any action that tar-
gets civilians, is part of the grand bargain of the reform of international 
organizations. Without forward movement on terrorism, Great Power 
engagement—especially on the part of the United States—on develop-
ment and collective security was unlikely. To some degree, progress 
on dealing with terrorism, promoting development, and enhancing 
human rights were the exposed nerves of the reform movement.
How did the World Summit deal with terrorism, conceptually 
and practically? Here too, the record is mixed. World leaders could 
not agree on a definition of terrorism. Consequently, no definition is 
included in the outcome document. They did agree to try again at the 
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next meeting of the General Assembly. The Summit did condemn ter-
rorism, without specifying precisely what constitutes terrorism and 
“welcomed” the Secretary-General’s identification of elements of a 
counter-terrorism strategy. The debate about the meaning of terrorism 
simmered just below the surface of the Summit’s deliberations: states 
must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with 
their obligations under international law, in particular human rights 
law, refugee law, and international humanitarian law. The strongest 
action by the World Summit was clear support for the early entry into 
effect of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism.
The Secretary-General followed up with recommendations for a 
global counter-terrorism strategy in his report to the General Assembly 
in April 2006.26 He urged members to dissuade, deny, and deter terror-
ists; to build state capacity to deal with terrorism; and to defend human 
rights even while they struggled against terrorism. In his report, Kofi 
Annan again unequivocally condemned terrorism, no matter what 
cause its perpetrators claim to serve, and urged member states to con-
clude a comprehensive convention on terrorism.
What is the scorecard of the United Nations on terrorism? Certainly, 
the Secretary-General did not succeed in persuading world leaders to 
speak with clarity on the meaning of terrorism. There was no unequiv-
ocal rejection of the targeting of civilians under any circumstances; no 
agreement on the illegitimacy of the violation of the rights of non-com-
batants. Leaders did move, however, on nuclear terrorism, a peril that 
all could recognize. It is difficult to conclude that significant progress 
was made, especially given the high priority the Secretary-General 
attached to this issue. One of the principal fault lines of twenty-first-
century conflict, a fault line that goes to the heart of human security, 
remains exposed and contested.
VII. Progress on Peace Building
A third big issue in the Secretary-General’s report on security was 
peace building. Despite the massive investment by the United Nations 
over the last decade and a half in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, 
and peace building, the record of sustained success has been discour-
aging. Approximately half of those societies that emerge from war 
and civil conflict relapse back into violence within five years.27 Senior 
leadership at the U.N. recognizes that while the problems in societies 
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that undergo prolonged civil war are deeply-rooted and challenging, 
resources could be better managed within the United Nations so that 
peace building becomes more effective and robust.28
The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change strongly 
recommended the creation of a Peace-Building Commission to identify 
countries that are under stress and at risk of collapse. The Commis-
sion’s mandate should be to lead and sustain the efforts of the inter-
national community in post-conflict peace building over “whatever 
period may be necessary.”29 In partnership with the national govern-
ment, the Commission should organize proactive assistance and plan 
for the transition between conflict and post-conflict peace building. 
The subtext of the panel was not difficult to read. The U.N. needed 
far better integration of its policy instruments and resources, and the 
capacity to coherently sustain its efforts over the lengthy periods of 
time that may be necessary to support a society struggling with the 
transition from war to peace.
The Secretary-General underlined and amplified the recommenda-
tion. He asked for a new intergovernmental Peace-Building Commis-
sion as well as a Peace-Building Support Office within the Secretariat. 
The Commission would have the capacity to coordinate all the relevant 
players, both within the broad institutional structure of the United 
Nations—across economic and security institutions—and with outside 
institutions. It would fill the “gaping hole” in the institutional capacity 
of the U.N. to address the transition from war to peace.
The Commission would serve as the focal point for expertise and 
provide money and strategic guidance for recovery work, reconstruc-
tion, and institution building in fragile states. In the immediate after-
math of war, it would help to ensure predictable financing for the 
recovery of national institutions; review and coordinate funding mech-
anisms, programs and agencies; provide a forum for sharing infor-
mation about post-conflict recovery strategies; review progress; and, 
especially important, extend the period of political attention to post-
conflict recovery. The Secretary-General asked for new institutional 
machinery to focus and sustain attention on post-conflict recovery, one 
of the difficult challenges that the United Nations has faced in the last 
two decades.
The Peace-Building Commission is one of the most significant out-
comes of the World Summit. Here the Summit displayed some creativ-
ity: it created the Commission and enabled subsequent negotiations 
to highlight some of the contentious issues of composition and report-
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ing. After several months of negotiations, the Security Council and 
the General Assembly adopted joint resolutions on 20 December 2005, 
establishing the Peace-Building Commission. Permanent members of 
the Commission are drawn from the Security Council (7), ECOSOC 
(7), top financial contributors (5), top troop contributors (5), and the 
General Assembly (5). The Commission would report annually to the 
General Assembly and to the international financial institutions. It is 
led by an Assistant Secretary-General, Carolyn McAskie from Canada, 
who is in charge of the Peace-Building Support Office within the U.N. 
Secretariat. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) will 
administer a multi-year standing Peace-Building Fund to support post-
conflict stabilization and capacity building.
The Commission will, of course, have to demonstrate its useful-
ness and effectiveness over the long trajectory of post-conflict recov-
ery. Much of what shapes recovery is clearly beyond its control, yet it 
does have the capacity to coordinate across institutional jurisdictions, 
to identify anomalies that can exist among the strategies of different 
kinds of institutions, to share best practices, to work together with 
state and non-governmental organizations, and to draw attention to 
the need for ongoing support, especially after political attention has 
shifted elsewhere. In all these ways, the Commission reflects the envi-
ronment in which the United Nations now operates: a dense web of 
international, state, and non-governmental organizations that all bring 
resources into the field, pursuing short- and long-term strategies in 
ways that can contradict one another.
VIII. Freedom to Live in Dignity
Nowhere has the imperative for reform been more apparent than in 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The Commission 
was widely regarded as dysfunctional. “The Commission’s capacity to 
perform its tasks,” the Secretary-General concluded, “has been increas-
ingly undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism… . a 
credibility deficit has developed, which casts a shadow on the reputa-
tion of the United Nations system as a whole.”30 The active presence 
of some of the most egregious violators of human rights, Libya and 
Sudan, made a mockery of human rights norms. To make matters 
worse, as Kofi Annan acknowledged, these states were able to use 
Commission procedures to prevent any investigation and reporting 
of their practices. In an era when protection of human rights is widely 
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recognized as a fundamental obligation of states, when an emergent 
concept of sovereignty focuses on the obligations of states to protect 
the rights of its citizens, and when concepts of human security are 
beginning to inform the understanding and practice of collective secu-
rity, nothing discredited the United Nations more than the practices of 
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.
In its early days, the Commission on Human Rights made a signifi-
cant contribution to international law. It passed the seminal Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights in 1948, followed by two International 
Covenants and several human rights treaties. In subsequent years, 
however, the Commission became increasingly ineffective in its work, 
partly because of its procedures for membership selection, particularly 
because of its working practices, and partly because of its accountabil-
ity. The Commission was created by the Economic and Social Council 
of the United Nations (ECOSOC) in 1946 to examine, monitor, and 
report on human rights issues and human rights violations world-
wide. It was subsidiary to ECOSOC, and its 53 members were elected 
by regional groupings. There were no qualifications whatsoever for 
membership aside from being selected by a regional group. It is this 
procedure for membership selection that allowed egregious violators 
of human rights to become members of the Commission. Six of the 53 
member countries, for example, were ranked as among the “worst of 
the worst” abusers of human rights by Freedom House.31
The Secretary-General asked the World Summit to abolish the Com-
mission and replace it with a standing Human Rights Council. He left 
open whether the Council should be a principal organ of the U.N. or 
a subsidiary of the General Assembly. In either case, he recommended 
that its members be elected directly by the General Assembly by a two-
thirds majority of members present and voting. This kind of procedure 
would break the hold of regional groupings on the selection of mem-
bers.32 In part because this recommendation went against the long-
established tradition of regional voting, the World Summit said little 
about the Human Rights Council other than to endorse its creation.33 
It then asked the President of the General Assembly to pursue negotia-
tions to establish the mandate, functions, size, composition, member-
ship, working methods, and procedures of the Council.
In March of 2006, the General Assembly passed a resolution creat-
ing the new Human Rights Council. The negotiations produced less 
than a wholly satisfactory outcome. The Council became a subsidiary 
organ of the General Assembly rather than an independent Council 
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within the United Nations. Its size was reduced only minimally, from 
53 to 47 members. The most disappointing outcome is its composition: 
regional blocs are given a specified number of seats and they are not required 
to nominate more countries than blocs so that General Assembly members 
could vote against a particularly unqualified candidate. Nor are countries 
currently under sanction by the United Nations barred from standing 
for membership. Finally, members are elected by a simple majority of 
those present and voting in the General Assembly, making it easier for 
a state with a questionable human rights record to get elected. Clearly, 
the safeguards built in to improve the quality of the membership on 
the Council are weak.
There were a few encouraging signs as the first members of the new 
Council were elected and held their first meeting in June 2006. The 
Commission’s members were selected behind closed doors and then 
usually elected by acclamation. Many members of the new Council 
had to compete for seats and all needed the support of a majority 
of all member states in a secret ballot. Algeria, China, Cuba, Paki-
stan, and Saudi Arabia, prominent on lists of rights abusers, are again 
members of the new Council, but Iran was not. Some members of the 
Commission—Sudan, Libya, Zimbabwe—were discouraged from run-
ning. This procedure clearly is an improvement, even if a modest one, 
over its predecessor. More important, candidate members made vol-
untary commitments to promote and uphold human rights, and will 
be expected to meet them or face possible suspension from the Coun-
cil.34 Council members will be the first to undergo the periodic annual 
review of their human rights record. Here, norm setting appears to 
define the boundaries of membership.
The Council has also established a new universal review mecha-
nism, which will periodically review the human rights records of all 
192 member states of the United Nations. It will meet at least three 
times a year, for a minimum of ten weeks per year (unlike the Com-
mission, which met only for six weeks every spring). Early work in the 
preparation of the Council has emphasized the importance of preven-
tive initiatives to defuse simmering crises. The Council will have an 
improved mechanism for meeting to deal with urgent human rights 
crises in real time.35
Much will depend on how the new Council interprets its mandate 
and enforces its standards, beginning with its own members. Centrally 
important will be how the Council exercises its reporting function 
and the role the Council gives to non-governmental organizations. 
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At its first meeting, the Council replicated a longstanding pattern of 
the Commission and condemned only Israel as a violator of human 
rights. If states with poor human rights records continue to be elected 
and serve, without review and without suspension, the Council will 
quickly lose legitimacy and credibility, as did its predecessor. Bloc 
voting continues to dominate and the record of the first six months is 
not at all encouraging. If the record remains as disappointing as it is 
currently, states and non-governmental organizations will look outside 
the U.N. as they seek to move the human rights agenda forward. The 
United Nations will fade into irrelevance when human rights are on 
the table.
IX. Managing the United Nations
Only a week before the opening of the World Summit, the Volcker 
Commission published a damning report on the corruption that had 
infected the U.N.’s Oil-for-Food program in Iraq. The program was 
begun in the mid-1990s to supervise Iraq’s sale of oil and use of the 
funds to buy food, medicine, and other goods and services necessary 
for the civilian population. A final report, published in October 2005, 
found that more than 2,000 companies from sixty countries had paid 
kickbacks to Saddam Hussein’s government. The program was jointly 
run by the Security Council and the U.N. Secretariat, but the report 
criticized senior staff at the U.N. for its failure to identify and stop the 
corruption. The report stung. From the top down, something had gone 
terribly awry in U.N. management.
The failure to manage the Oil-for-Food program appropriately 
and the charge that U.N. peacekeeping forces sexually exploited local 
women and children are troubling. They are disturbing for two quite 
different reasons. They demonstrate serious failures of discipline, 
financial control, and accountability on the part of U.N. staff and man-
agement. Both these failures go directly to the heart of the U.N. peace 
and security agenda. A capacity to manage a program of sanctions is 
critical in a world organization that seeks effective alternatives to war. 
Insuring discipline among peacekeepers is a critical requirement for 
a U.N. that is expanding its role in peacekeeping and peace building. 
Neither of these are trivial failures at the margin of the organization. 
The Secretary-General made the unglamorous subject of improved 
management one of the top priorities of U.N. reform. The timing could 
not have been worse.
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Some of the reforms that are necessary were obvious. The Volcker 
Commission pointed to the confusion of responsibility between the 
Security Council and the Secretariat as a principal cause of the dilu-
tion of the authority of the Secretariat and the evasion of responsibil-
ity. It was nevertheless clear that significant change was necessary in 
the operating structures of the Secretariat. The Secretary-General had 
a deputy secretary-general, with whom he shared responsibility for 
management, but he had no chief operating officer who had the kinds 
of responsibilities—and accountability—that most large organizations 
find necessary. It is the Fifth Committee, a committee of the whole, 
which currently has overall responsibility for management. In other 
words, 192 member states formally supervise senior management.
The outcome document of the World Summit identified a set of 
broad priorities to guide reform. It recommended the creation of an 
ethics office and enactment of rules to protect “whistleblowers” who 
come forward within the organization. It asked that policies of finan-
cial disclosure and conflict of interest be reviewed and upgraded; that 
the Office of Internal Oversight Services, which performs an audit-
like function, be strengthened on an urgent basis; and that the Secre-
tary-General submit an independent external review of performance 
within the United Nations and within the specialized agencies. It also 
requested that the General Assembly create an independent oversight 
advisory committee. Finally, it asked that all mandates older than five 
years be reviewed. There are literally thousands of these mandates still 
on U.N. books.
Much of what the World Summit asked for is routine in large organi-
zations and would significantly improve performance. Nevertheless, at 
the United Nations, these instructions had bite. They touched directly 
on sharp disagreements between the Group of 77 and developed states 
about the direction and importance of secretariat reform, in particular, 
and a review of mandates more generally. The G-77 countries worried 
that they would lose their political control to the Security Council and 
the Secretary-General if some of these recommendations were imple-
mented. The high-profile engagement of the U.S. Ambassador to the 
U.N. on the issues of both management and mandates provoked hos-
tility rather than support. Not only did these recommendations bite, 
they also stung.
To jump-start the reform process, Ambassadors Allan Rock of Can-
ada and Munir Akram of Pakistan were asked to co-chair a committee 
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charged with management reform. Their agenda looked much like that 
identified by the World Summit:
•  To improve the management of human resources to promote a 
merit-based system of recruitment and retention.
•  To reform budget processes through improvement in accounting, 
auditing, and external oversight to meet international standards.
•  To review the mandates, rules, and regulations of the U.N., as part 
of a broader examination of the relevance and effectiveness of the 
work of the U.N.
I look at each of these in turn. The management of human resources, 
the first of the three big planks of management reform, is central to the 
functioning of the U.N. The Office of the Secretary-General has no dis-
cretion in the hiring of senior officials, there is no chief operating officer 
tasked with overseeing day-to-day administration, and management 
systems and financial systems have not kept pace with other public 
institutions. The Secretary-General made specific proposals for change 
in six areas: people, leadership, information and communications tech-
nology, delivery of services, budget and finance, and governance.36 
He proposed increasing his authority and discretion to reallocate jobs 
and money without approval from the budgeting committee; profes-
sionalizing recruitment and training practices; outsourcing abroad 
costly services that are now provided by its New York headquarters; 
regrouping and clustering by function twenty-five departments that 
now report directly to the Secretary-General; and delegating authority 
for management policies and overall operational matters to the Deputy 
Secretary-General. The Secretary-General was trying to reduce ineffec-
tive, cumbersome, and at times archaic management by the General 
Assembly.
A firestorm erupted. G-77 countries interpreted these reforms as a 
dilution of their already limited authority within the General Assem-
bly and a transfer of power to the Security Council, particularly its per-
manent members. Kofi Annan withdrew two of the most controversial 
proposals redistributing authority from the General Assembly to the 
Secretary-General on budgeting. Nevertheless, the Budget Committee, 
which usually works by consensus, voted 108 to 50 in favor of a resolu-
tion offered by South Africa in the name of the Group of 77 and China. 
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The resolution rejected or delayed most of the management reforms 
that had been submitted to the committee. Dumisano Kumalo of South 
Africa, the leader of the Group of 77, complained that the reform pro-
posals transferred authority from the General Assembly to the Security 
Council and the Office of the Secretary-General, in which Northern 
countries are far more influential. The Secretary-General lost a crucial 
round in the battle to move management procedures within the U.N. 
closer to international standards.37 It is possible that some of these pro-
posals will re-emerge during the honeymoon that the new Secretary-
General will enjoy in the first six months of 2007.
Much more progress has been made in the reform of the budget pro-
cess. An ethics office has been created, new protection has been put in 
place for whistleblowers, a panel of outside experts has been appointed 
to support the internal oversight office at the United Nations, and an 
external audit procedure has been instituted. All this has been accom-
plished in less than a year. Major challenges still remain, however, 
in streamlining budget procedures and in introducing much-needed 
flexibility in the capacity to transfer funds within existing budgetary 
allocations.
The review of mandates is likely to be a much longer and less pro-
ductive process. Just a few weeks after the Secretary-General deliv-
ered his report on management reform, he submitted his report on the 
review of mandates to the General Assembly, along with an electronic 
database of mandates that are over five years old.38 There are over 
3,000 such mandates.
The selection of mandates for review is itself politically controver-
sial, closely linked to the issue of Palestine. Alongside the review of 
mandates, which is currently the object of consultations within the 
General Assembly, a parallel review of rules and regulations looks 
at the organizing rules of the central U.N. agencies. For example, is 
it appropriate to vest the Fifth Committee with overall managerial 
responsibility or to establish a Select Committee, with a representative 
group of nations serving on a rotating basis? This kind of question, 
too, is highly charged and currently blocked. The process of mandate 
review is likely to be long and time consuming, with little or no short-
term or even medium-term outcomes.
The glacially slow process of management reform is discouraging 
because it speaks to the lack of core competencies in the areas of peace-
keeping, peace building, and security, and to the quality of staff the 
United Nations can recruit and retain. The deep divisions within the 
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U.N. are predictable and understandable, even if they can be disabling 
at times. Any “grand bargain,” which is designed to bridge these dif-
ferences on development, security, and human rights, will depend on 
an enhanced capacity of the U.N. to manage and deliver results. It is 
discouraging that this Secretary-General was unable to bridge the gap 
on management. The new Secretary-General will have a short window 
at the beginning of his term. If no progress is made, the U.N. may well 
become an increasingly disabled and marginalized institution, capable 
of doing much less than its members need.
X. The United Nations as Global Metaphor
I asked in the introduction to this essay whether the U.N. is manag-
ing a global order that is structured and legitimate, or whether it is an 
important part of restructuring a global system that is fragmented and 
contested? The answer to this question, I argue, matters in creating rea-
sonable expectations of what the U.N. can and cannot do. This review 
of the challenges the Secretary-General faced in trying to reform the 
U.N. provides a preliminary answer.
The structure and the legitimacy of the global “order” are both in 
question. The global system is simultaneously fragmenting and re-
forming as new kinds of organizations—non-governmental with gov-
ernments, private as well as public, international institutions alongside 
states—are recognized and given official voice in the international 
machinery. Not only are new kinds of organizations participating 
actively in shaping the global order but some are organized in differ-
ent ways. Both war and peace are being made by organizations joined 
together as networks. They are characterized by flatter structures, with 
decentralized structures of decision-making and built-in redundancy 
so that they are better able to survive in challenging environments. 
Networks of non-governmental organizations raise funds and orches-
trate strategies of recovery in post-conflict societies. Al-Qaida and 
Hizbollah, structured as distributed networks with decentralized capa-
bilities, wage war against states. These networks are resilient, flexible, 
and nimble, with a capacity to move information quickly, to deploy 
sophisticated technologies, and to operate “close to the ground.”
In this complex and diverse ecology of a global order with multiple 
species, and with new forms of organizations that play new roles, 
the newly created Peace-Building Commission may well stand as a 
metaphor for the broader United Nations. The Commission emerges, I 
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argue, as one among many important nodes, but with unique capaci-
ties to serve as a clearinghouse for information and as a traffic coor-
dinator in a crowded and noisy environment that is in the process of 
reshaping itself. This description of the Commission may well be an 
apt description of the United Nations in the decade ahead. It may be 
apt because the global environment is not well structured or with clear 
rules that are widely accepted. Rather, the U.N. is working in an envi-
ronment that is simultaneously fragmenting and re-forming. Norms 
are contested and the meanings of some of its most fundamental insti-
tutions, such as sovereignty, are in the process of redefinition.
What can we expect of the United Nations in this complex and 
diverse ecology? Most of the answer we already see but some we do 
not. We need a U.N. that is deeply embedded in a chain of connections 
that functions as a central node in the network of global institutions. 
More and more, this is what the U.N. is doing—in the Peace-Building 
Commission, in the Global Compact that brings together corporate 
leaders with non-governmental organizations under the auspices of 
the U.N., and in the dialogue the Secretary-General sponsored among 
world religions. The United Nations is the world’s convener, enabler, 
and facilitator, and that is no small accomplishment.
To succeed as a central node in newly emergent global networks, 
though, the U.N. will have to become more than a convener and 
enabler. It will have to bring to the table a capacity to manage and to 
manage well. Good management is boring, unglamorous, and pedes-
trian in comparison to other dramatic challenges the U.N. faces, but it 
is a prerequisite for effective performance in all that it does. In network 
language, the U.N. must be able to share information quickly and 
effectively, and to move resources and people nimbly, with a mini-
mum of bureaucratic consultation and delay. If it is slow, cumbersome, 
and hobbled with consultations up and down the chain of command, 
it becomes an unattractive partner for networks that are moving in 
real time. If its staff becomes corruptible, the damage to its credibil-
ity, legitimacy, and effectiveness will be incalculable. Here, as I have 
argued, the U.N. secretariat faces real challenges that its leadership, 
through the Secretary-General, must meet. It is legitimate, in my view, 
to hold the Secretary-General and his senior staff accountable for the 
performance of those who are responsible for the management of the 
United Nations.
Born in an age in which states were the only legitimate participants 
in world politics, can the United Nations adapt to an ecology wherein 
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states are joined by non-governmental organizations and global corpo-
rations, other international institutions (both public and private), and 
militias, each networked together across borders? Can the U.N. adapt 
to a world in which technology is revolutionizing the global movement 
of information, warfare, disease, and production? If it is to become 
more than merely a convenient place to stop and talk, it must be able to 
deploy its resources with the same speed, flexibility, and effectiveness 
as the best of the rest in its environment. This is the challenge for the 
new Secretary-General. •
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